One might ask what connection this historical story—more legend than verifiable fact—has with the repeated claims advanced by the administration of Donald Trump regarding Greenland, the largest island in the world, with an area of over 2.1 million square kilometers. The answer lies in the striking resemblance between President Trump’s assertions about Greenland’s vital importance to U.S. security and the method by which he seeks to take possession of this territory, and the solution chosen by the Macedonian king in 334 BCE.
The transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe can be compared to a Gordian knot, but the knot is not necessarily a problem; in this case, it is a solution. The Gordian knot had to be undone for the prophecy to be fulfilled, for Alexander to prove his stature as a providential figure. In the present case, Donald Trump appears to have decided that it is necessary to cut the Gordian knot of transatlantic relations in order to demonstrate that the big stick strategy, characteristic of the early twentieth century, has not exhausted its potential. The forcible takeover of Greenland would irreversibly sever the Gordian knot of transatlantic relations, deal a fatal blow to international law, discard the Charter of the United Nations, and obliterate the political legacy of all U.S. presidents since the Second World War. NATO, as the Prime Minister of Denmark has pointed out, could cease to exist de facto, not through formal dissolution, but through the loss of credibility as a collective security mechanism. Who would still take NATO seriously if one of its members were to annex the territory of an allied state?
Only Turkey and Greece, among NATO member states, have found themselves in the paradoxical situation of engaging in military confrontation, yet these confrontations were limited and managed under alliance pressure, without involving the deliberate annexation of an ally’s territory. Nevertheless, increasingly persistent questions exist regarding Turkey’s role within NATO. Turkey’s foreign policy actions in recent years no longer suggest an ally, but rather a competitor. Turkey has positioned itself as NATO’s Achilles’ heel, a vulnerability exploited by the alliance’s adversaries, first and foremost—but not exclusively—by Vladimir Putin.
Assuming that President Trump’s statements are not mere rhetoric and that the behavior of his administration indicates a willingness to act in accordance with its declarations, the annexation of Greenland could reach the White House agenda and might occur. What would Europeans do in such a case? A good question—but one that remains unanswered, since no coherent response exists. Would Europe respond militarily? Would it impose sanctions on the United States? Hard to believe, at least in the short term. Europe lacks the military strength necessary to oppose the United States, as well as the economic leverage required to impose effective sanctions.
It appears that, in the short term, all advantages lie on the side of the United States, and that the annexation of a territory belonging to a democratic and allied nation, in accordance with the canons of classical imperialism, could prove difficult to stop. In the long term, however, the costs the United States would pay would be enormous, and it does not appear that President Trump fully understands the nature of the act he seems intent on carrying out.
Europe is already quite circumspect regarding the transatlantic alliance, and this has accelerated its turn toward rearmament. The annexation of Greenland could lead to the disappearance of NATO, if not de jure, then certainly de facto. It is entirely possible that Denmark would leave NATO in protest against the violation of its national sovereignty. The solution for Europe is within reach, though not immediate. Europe can and must create its own defensive alliance, a treaty that would include all European states, whether or not they are members of the European Union, with the notable exception of certain actors: the states of the Caucasus, Turkey, Russia, and Belarus.
There is no need to elaborate on why these actors are unsuitable partners for building a European security alliance. However, the most serious consequence of the Trump administration’s actions would be the degradation—difficult to repair—of allies’ trust in the United States’ determination to support its partners. This would harm the United States in the long term, even in the absence of direct sanctions.
U.S. power does not reside primarily in its military strength, but in the attractiveness of its democratic institutions and in its desire to export them to as many parts of the world as possible, in line with what many American presidents have called Manifest Destiny. Throughout its history, the United States has experienced numerous moments of overtly imperial behavior. One such example is the war with Mexico between 1846 and 1848. A significant portion of present-day U.S. territory was obtained as a result of this conflict, through formal annexation following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In 1898, the United States won a war against Spain, a declining European power. This conflict brought the United States a colonial or quasi-colonial empire: Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. Cuba and the Philippines eventually gained independence, though through different historical processes: Cuba relatively quickly, but under strong American political influence, and the Philippines only in 1946, after a brutal war waged by the United States against the local independence movement (1899–1902) and following the Second World War.
Puerto Rico and Guam remain under U.S. control to this day. Under normal circumstances, these territories should have been admitted to the Union with full rights, as was the case with Hawaii in 1959, but for unclear reasons they have remained territories that resemble colonies more than what U.S. authorities claim them to be. Puerto Rico, for example, is an associated territory of the United States. It is neither an independent state nor a full member of the Union. Thus, however benign the term “associated territory” may sound, it indicates that Puerto Rico is, in practice, closer to a colony.
Why would Greenland wish to come under U.S. control, when territories such as Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, or the U.S. Virgin Islands are treated as colonies? France, for example, transformed its overseas territories into “overseas departments,” meaning they are an integral part of France. Denmark has done the same. Greenland and the Faroe Islands belong to Denmark, enjoy autonomy, and their citizens hold Danish citizenship and, implicitly, European citizenship. Natives of American Samoa do not automatically receive U.S. citizenship, a fact that says much about how the United States treats its territories.
The annexation of Greenland would cause the entire complex structure of global alliances built by the United States during the Cold War to collapse like a house of cards. U.S. allies act as force multipliers. The United States alone is powerful, but it is far more powerful through its allies, who until recently viewed it with admiration and trust. That no longer seems to be the case. This represents the Trump administration’s great failure of perception. Following a potential annexation of Greenland, many U.S. allies would no longer consider Washington a reliable ally.
Europe will rightly ask where the greatest threat to the European Union originates: from Russia and China, or even from the United States itself—an idea that, though it may seem absurd, is becoming increasingly real.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the importance of allies. All U.S. allies supported, to varying degrees, the “global war on terror.” The United States was not alone, but part of an impressive coalition willing to help because Washington was regarded as the beacon of the free world. Under current circumstances, if—God forbid—the United States were to face a similar situation, allies would condemn the acts, but how many would do more than that if their concrete interests were not directly served?
Alliances are built on solidarity, and when the United States, under the Trump administration, acts as a self-interested state actor that does not play by the rules, a natural question arises: why help at all? Trump is dismantling, consciously or not, force multipliers and alliance architecture, which will damage the global position of the United States in the long term. Through the annexation of Greenland, the United States would not become stronger, but weaker—infinitely weaker.
The United Nations risks sharing the fate of the League of Nations, in the sense of losing relevance and the capacity to prevent major conflicts. What role could the UN still play in a world where law is defined by what a state’s military is capable of doing? The UN and all the generous principles associated with it are doomed, and this would take the world back more than a century. We would return to the grim era of realpolitik, in which the world is not governed by the principle formulated by the Romanian diplomat Nicolae Titulescu—“the force of law, not the law of force”—but by its exact opposite: the law of force. This would entail not only the dismantling of the UN, but also the reopening of brutal competition for power among major states, with the risk of regional wars and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
More and more states will conclude that their security can no longer be guaranteed, under conditions of abandoned international law, except through the possession of such weapons. It is quite evident that the arrest of the North Korean leader, following a scenario similar to other U.S. interventions, is unrealistic, and North Korea’s nuclear arsenal demonstrates that nuclear weapons are perceived as the most solid guarantee of security. The question is increasingly asked whether Russia would have attacked Ukraine had it retained the nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union. Since the United States, under the Trump administration, appears willing to act externally in a manner similar to Putin’s Russia—not as a political regime, but through recourse to unilateral actions that ignore international norms—more states will be tempted to develop their own nuclear capabilities.
Highly industrialized and wealthy states such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, or Germany could come to consider such options, depending on the degradation of the security environment and the credibility of external guarantees. The first three would no longer be able to rely on U.S. protection, while China’s rise would push them to seek their own nuclear umbrella. Germany would be compelled to deter any form of Russian aggression in Europe, making nuclear weapons, from this perspective, an extreme solution. Turkey, a power with ambitions extending beyond the regional level, could proceed in the same direction, followed by Saudi Arabia, while Iran has pursued this objective for a long time. A world with ever more nuclear weapons is a world in which the risk of nuclear war increases exponentially.
The architecture of alliances, international law, the role of the United Nations, and nuclear nonproliferation rest, to a large extent, on the United States. Its abdication from the principles that made it a model to follow, and its return to the logic of a self-interested great power, will push the world closer to chaos, conflict, and aggression. In such a world, the United States will not be stronger, but weaker, and American citizens will not be safer, but more exposed to danger.
The greatest mistake of the Trump administration, generated by its imprudent rhetoric regarding the annexation of Greenland, is the alienation of Europe, the United States’ most loyal and predictable ally. Europe will rearm and build its security on its own potential, but the United States and Europe will no longer be allies, but competitors, generating major losses for both sides. Europe does not desire this outcome, but the United States, under the Trump administration, appears to be provoking it. Cutting the transatlantic knot with a sword—a knot that unites and strengthens the democratic world—represents a strategic gift to the Russia–China axis. Any military professional knows that whatever benefits the enemy cannot benefit us.
If the United States is genuinely concerned about Greenland’s defense, the logical and readily available solution would be to strengthen the American military presence there through an agreement with Denmark, not to annex the island. Such a solution would reinforce transatlantic cohesion and would receive Copenhagen’s consent. Europe’s natural reaction, in the event of Greenland’s annexation, would be the creation of a European defensive alliance without the United States, the intensification of strategic autonomy, and a reduction in dependence on American weaponry. The most serious consequence, however, would be the transformation of the EU and the United States from allies into competitors, in a world in which the United States already lacks no adversaries.
Author: PhD Ghețău Gheorghe-Florin
Niciun comentariu:
Trimiteți un comentariu